According to the WTO, the concept of market access for goods refers to the conditions, including tariff and non-tariff measures, under which specific products are admitted into the markets of states[1]. In this article, we will attempt to outline a conception of market access adapted to the current evolution of the multilateral trading system and analyse the role that competitive intelligence can play in this context, especially as it relates to the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Definition and Stakes

In broader terms, the WTO’s definition could also apply to services and service providers, as well as investors and their investments. Market access would then encompass all tariff and non-tariff barriers (including regulations and procedures) that determine a company’s ability to tap into the opportunities of a given market — whether national or international — to sell goods and services or to invest for production and distribution.

From this perspective, two types of market access can be distinguished: preferential and non-preferential access. Non-preferential access implies that businesses, goods, services, and service providers do not benefit from any particular preferences (such as tariff exemptions or relaxed regulatory obligations) to enter a given market. In such cases, market access is governed by the general rule of law, which can be either liberal or restrictive but must be applied to all partners on a non-discriminatory basis.

Preferential access, on the other hand, is governed by specific rules established in a preferential agreement. It is characterised by less stringent conditions than those imposed by general law and only applies to goods, services, service providers, investors, and their investments originating from states that are party to the trade agreement. For companies, this distinction is essential as it can significantly affect the competitiveness of their products and services in the target market.

Mattoo, Rocha, & Ruta (2020) define deep trade agreements as reciprocal arrangements between countries that go beyond trade in goods and also cover broader policy areas. These agreements aim to regulate three overlapping areas: (a) policies that establish the five economic integration rights, (b) policies that support those rights by limiting government discretion, and (c) policies that promote social or consumer welfare by regulating exporter behaviour. This conceptual evolution calls for a broader consideration of the contribution of competitive intelligence to the analysis and development of market access strategies.

Whether in a preferential or non-preferential context, the theoretical debate around market access revolves around liberalism and protectionism. Without delving into the details of these schools of thought, it suffices to note that our conception of market access is rooted in the notion of deep trade agreements — a form of regional trade agreement (RTA) that has evolved since the WTO’s creation. In fact, the number of RTAs in force globally has increased significantly, from 47 in 1995 to 374 in 2024. Beyond the numerical growth of these agreements, their scope has also deepened. While in the 1950s RTAs covered around eight policy areas on average, they now cover about 17.

Despite the global reduction of tariff barriers, analyses show that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have become the main obstacles to market access — for both goods and services. For example, WTO[2] data indicates that as of 31 December 2021, there were 22,065 sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures in place covering 329 specific trade concerns, 32,478 technical barriers to trade (TBTs) related to 715 issues, and numerous trade defence measures: 2,443 anti-dumping measures, 316 countervailing duties, and 121 safeguard measures. In agriculture, there were 652 special safeguard measures, 1,274 tariff quota measures, 429 export subsidy measures, and 1,636 quantitative restrictions.

In this context, the collection, analysis, and strategic use of information to support business and government decision-making in market entry and exploitation should reflect both the expanding scope of deep trade agreements and the changing nature of market access barriers. In other words, the core pillars of competitive intelligence applied to market access must be redefined accordingly. This adaptation is particularly urgent in Africa, where information asymmetries in business and decision-making spheres — combined with high levels of informality — hinder the capacity of actors to innovate, gain market share, and contribute fully to national prosperity and public welfare.

Competitive Intelligence, Market Access and the AfCFTA

The AfCFTA agreement is a complex legal instrument. Beyond the framework agreement establishing the AfCFTA, it includes eight approved protocols and 41 annexes and regulations. Each annex governs at least one trade or economic policy instrument with the aim of promoting intra-African trade, industrialisation, and economic diversification.

The structure of the AfCFTA agreement includes:

• The Protocol on Trade in Goods, which comprises nine annexes covering tariff concession schedules, rules of origin, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), technical barriers to trade (TBTs), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, trade remedies, and transit procedures.
• The Protocol on Trade in Services, which includes six annexes covering schedules of specific commitments, most-favoured-nation (MFN) exemptions, air transport services related to the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), the transitional work programme, priority sectors, and the regulatory cooperation framework.
• The Protocol on Rules and Procedures for Dispute Settlement, comprising three annexes dealing with deliberation procedures, expert review, and the code of conduct for arbitrators and panel members.
• The Protocol on Investment, which includes two annexes on the Pan-African Trade and Investment Agency and dispute resolution.
• The Protocol on Intellectual Property Rights, which includes nine annexes covering plant variety protection, geographical indications, trademarks, copyright and related rights, patents, utility models, industrial designs, traditional knowledge, cultural expressions, and genetic resources, as well as the AfCFTA Intellectual Property Office.
• The Protocol on Competition Policy, comprising four annexes, including those on merger thresholds, the powers and procedures of the Authority, the composition and operation of the Tribunal, and the revised regulation on the creation of the AfCFTA Competition Network.
• The Protocol on Women and Youth, which currently does not have annexes at this stage.
• The Protocol on Digital Trade, which includes eight annexes on digital identities, legitimate public interest justifications for source code disclosure, online security and safety, emerging and advanced technologies, cross-border data flows, cross-border digital payments, fintech, and digital rules of origin.

Given the complexity of this instrument, competitive intelligence must play a crucial role in helping companies and policymakers better understand the competitive landscape across all these areas and anticipate economic trends. This role includes securing access to strategic data (factor endowments, investment opportunities, regulations and procedures, market trends, consumer behaviour and preferences), reducing information asymmetries, identifying opportunities, protecting against risks, and enabling influence and strategic positioning — including the identification of key actors and the shaping of their decisions.

Dr. Jacob Kotcho

[1] https://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/markacc_f/markacc_f.htm#:~:text=Le%20concept%20d’acc%C3%A8s%20aux,produits%20sp%C3%A9cifiques%20sur%20leurs%20march%C3%A9s.

[2] See I-TIP Goods: Integrated analysis and retrieval of notified non-tariff measures, https://i-tip.wto.org/goods/Default.aspx